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Nature, Civility and Eschatology:  
Thomas Hobbes’s Progress in Three Acts
Abstract This paper argues that Thomas Hobbes’s theory contains an account 
of progressive defragmentation and unification of power, accompanied by the 
progression in human reasoning capacities. If the consequence of human nature 
is abandonment of natural condition and subjection to a sovereign, then similar 
principles should apply to the sovereigns themselves, since Hobbes sees them 
as continuing to exist in the state of nature. In turn, the relations between sov-
ereigns must also lead to defragmentation of political authority, either by conquest 
or through peaceful submission. Total defragmentation of power might also have 
eschatological consequences, as the unified power of one human being over the 
whole world would remove “external violence” as a cause of “the dissolution of 
a commonwealth” while the perfection of reason would progressively remove 
the “internal” causes. This is a hypothetical situation that could relate Hobbes’s 
description of the Kingdom of God from Leviathan to his wider political theory 
by marking the single sovereign representative of now immortal all-encompass-
ing Leviathan as the Antichrist and thus announcing the second coming of Christ.
Keywords: Hobbes, progress, determinism, sovereign, world government,  antichrist.
Introduction
In the mid 1650s, Thomas Hobbes engaged in a famous debate with bish-
op John Bramhall. Hobbes was a determinist and, among other things, 
denied against Bramhall that men have freedom of will. Men’s will and 
 actions are ultimately caused by God’s will, as “every act of man’s will, and 
every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from 
another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of 
God the first of all causes,)”. (Hobbes, 1651: 109) God is “the First Mover” 
and Hobbes (1651: 53, 4) argues that “[w]hen a body is once in motion, it 
moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally”. If this is the case, then 
in Leviathan Hobbes might be telling us a linear story of human progress 
that starts with the state of nature, follows the creation of the state and 
ends with its eventual demise. In this paper I will argue that Hobbes’s ac-
count can be logically divided into three consecutive conditions that cor-
respond to three stages of human development: 1) state of nature; 2) civil 
condition and 3) the kingdom of God. This causality is a part of Hobbes’s 
wider mechanist philosophical framework that starts with his thoughts on 
human nature, extends into statehood and ends with eschatology.
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There are a number of features of Hobbes’s state of nature that compel 
people to establish “a common Power to keep them all in awe”. (Hobbes, 
1651: 62) Firstly, there is mechanist philosophical and theological back-
ground against which Hobbes’s account of the state of nature is developed. 
If Hobbes identifies God with “the First Mover” and if an object that He sets 
in motion “moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally”, Hobbes’s ac-
count has to be considered as profoundly determinist. (Hobbes, 1651: 53, 
4) This is certainly true for the laws of physics, but Hobbes’s mechanism 
also extends to the factors that govern human behaviour: reason and pas-
sions (among which fear is most prominent). As Hobbes (1651: 64) argues, 
a human being is placed in the state of nature, “though with a possibility 
to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason”. 
Both of these motivators are God-given. The laws of nature are the divine 
“dictates of Reason” (Hobbes, 1651: 80) and the importance of human rea-
soning as a motivator is unquestionable. On the other hand, people “can 
have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is 
not the cause”. (Hobbes, 1651: 147) Since Hobbes mentions nothing that 
could hinder them, it is safe to assume that both aspects of human nature, 
if sufficiently developed, actually guarantee the emergence of the state. 
The creation of the state thus becomes more than an option, it becomes a 
natural necessity. This is also argued by Stanton (2008: 69 -71) who com-
pares the structure of Hobbes’s and Aquinian arguments and demonstrates 
that “[o]n Hobbes’s view, an agent’s voluntary actions, whose object is 
‘some Good to himselfe’, always proceed from a prior cause ‘in a continu-
all chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes)’, 
that is, from necessity”.
Robert Kraynak (1983: 89) rightfully argues that Hobbes’s “writings present 
a coherent and consistent theory of history, the subject of which is the evo-
lution of man from barbarism to civilization.” Although I agree with Kray-
nak on this point, I disagree with his claim that Hobbes’s theory of history 
“lacks the idea of inevitable development toward an end or final stage, and 
[that] it is, for the most part, a story of retrogression rather than of prog-
ress.” Hobbes is explicit about the kingdom of God as the final common-
wealth on Earth, although he is not as clear about the ways in which the 
earthly civil society is to be transformed into its heavenly successor. Fur-
thermore, Hobbes does not consider civilization “no better than savagery 
and in certain respects is a more miserable and degraded condition.” (Kray-
nak, 1983: 94) Although it is obvious that Hobbes was more than aware of 
the deficiencies of political constitutions of his day, he also considers them 
a consequence of imperfect reasoning. Therefore we can create the “ever-
lasting constitution” if we work hard at developing our rational faculties 
and scientific insight into the way societies function. This is a task of polit-
ical science, which can only flourish within the safety of a commonwealth. 
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Hobbes’s natural condition: passions dominate reason
Hobbes’s account of the progression of mankind begins with the state of na-
ture and it can be traced back to The Elements of Law. He argues there that 
“the estate of men in this natural liberty is the estate of war” (Hobbes, 1889: 
72). This account is fully expanded in Leviathan where Hobbes (1651: 
60-63) dedicates the 13th chapter to examining “the NATURALL CONDI-
TION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery”. This condition is 
defined by the absence of the sovereign authority and it is based on Hobbes’s 
views of human beings’ psychological and physical properties. Both kinds 
of properties are marked by the relative natural equality of human beings. 
Hobbes (1651: 60) does not deny that there are differences between hu-
mans, but they are “not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon 
claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as 
he.” This applies both to physical and mental strengths. They are also equal 
in terms of their psychology. They have the same desires and the most im-
portant of these “ends” is “their owne conservation”. (Hobbes, 1651: 61) 
The strongest of all desires, self-preservation is a consequence of another 
shared property of men and that is their mortality. Finally, all human be-
ings are endowed by reason, through which they can intuitively compre-
hend the natural law. In fact, Hobbes (1651: 282) identifies the natural law 
with “the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart”.
These internal factors govern human behaviour in the state of nature. How-
ever, they are not equally significant. The single most important appetite 
is the desire for preservation or its counterpart aversion, the fear of death. 
Hobbes (1651: 25) defines fear as “Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the 
object”. This feeling defines the lives of people living in the state of nature 
and it should eventually remind them not to disturb the peace established 
by the sovereign’s absolute rule. In Hobbes’s (1651: 63) words, “[t]he Pas-
sions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things 
as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to 
obtain them.” Blits (1989: 417) summarises this argument and notes that 
fear serves a double purpose for Hobbes: “At once the principal cause of 
war and the principal means to peace, fear is the basis both of man’s most 
urgent plight and of his only possible escape.”
Before proceeding any further, we should briefly discuss Hobbes’s notion 
of fear. As Blits (1989: 418) argues, “Hobbesian fear is best understood 
as primal, indeterminate fear of the unknown”. Therefore, a human being 
in the state of nature lives in constant fear of other people. This feeling 
is motivated by her or his inability to predict the actions of others and it 
can be described as an aversion, since “[a]version wee have for things, not 
onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know wheth-
er they will hurt us, or not.” (Hobbes, 1651: 24) Endowed only with (as I 
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will discuss a bit later – imperfect) rationality and primarily motivated by 
their urge for self-preservation, agents in the state of nature are strongly 
inclined to take on a distrustful and conservative attitude towards their 
fellows. Since they lack external guarantees that others will behave coop-
eratively they simply cannot know when or whether to trust others. This 
is the state of radical doubt that places people in mutual relationships that 
Hampton (1997: 42-48) describes as single-play prisoner’s dilemmas. As 
she argues, in such a setup cooperation is rational only if “others in that 
state are also disposed to perform them”. (Hampton, 1997: 47) Further-
more, being creatures motivated by a range of passions (that do not con-
flict with the primary urge for self-preservation although they might very 
well conflict with self-preservation of others), agents in the state of nature 
cannot count on others to act rationally, either. (ibid.: 46) Moreover, even 
if there was strong mutual commitment to acting rationally, people’s ratio-
nal capacities can and do differ significantly. Therefore, one cannot trust 
even the least passionate of his fellows to act in a (sufficiently) rational 
manner. The only solution, then, is to endow a single person or a group of 
people with sovereign authority, thus establishing an external arbiter that 
will bring relative certainty to people’s lives and enable their mutual coop-
eration. The sovereign, thus, becomes the universal object of fear that ef-
fectively replaces the web of particular fears that his subjects feel towards 
each other. This lesser evil establishes civil order since for Hobbes, as Blits’s 
(1989: 426) suggests, “[t]he common good requires a common fear”.
On the other hand, Hobbesian natural human is without external guid-
ance in the radically unknown and, thus, uncertain world. This individu-
al is self-centred1 and aware of his own existence, his passions, his urge 
to live and his rational faculties. On the other hand, although he is able 
to perceive the world he inhabits, he is profoundly ignorant of its initial 
cause. The lack of this knowledge makes predicting future very hard, if not 
impossible, resulting in constant “[a]nxiety for the future time” (Hobbes, 
1651: 51), a strong feeling that is only second to his deep distrust towards 
his peers. Therefore, he can get no external guidance, whether from God 
as “some cause, whereof there is no former cause”, (ibid.) or from his fel-
lows, with whom he is roughly equal in his nescience. The only guidance he 
can receive comes through introspection, by realising that the only rational 
thing to do is to participate in the creation of a Hobbesian commonwealth. 
Since it was God who made him fundamentally fearful and endowed him 
with reason, no action that follows from those natural facts can be in op-
position to God’s will. This is especially true for the creation of the state, 
as this is the main consequence of human nature.
1  Individuals in the state of nature are also proud, as “every man looketh that his com-
panion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe”. (Hobbes, 1651: 61)
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Hobbes’s civil condition:  
(the right) reason rules over passions
Hobbes considers reason to be the same for all human beings and believes 
that people generally do have (some) rational capacity. However, it would be 
wrong to assert that everybody is equally endowed in this regard. For Hobbes 
(1651: 18) reasoning is a kind of arithmetic, “Adding and Substracting […] 
of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and 
signifying of our thoughts”. The same as we use arithmetic as a tool for un-
derstanding the laws of physics, we use reasoning to discover the laws of 
nature. Consequently, not everybody is capable of fully grasping these laws: 
“as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves 
may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of  Reasoning, 
the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive them-
selves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is alwayes 
Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art” (ibid.)
However, since “no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of 
men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast 
up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it”, it is in the 
interest of peace and safety to appoint the sovereign who will be the arbiter 
in potential disputes that could come up as a consequence of the inequality 
between individual rational faculties. (ibid.) Hobbes’s account of rationali-
ty presupposes progressive development of rational capacities, since he be-
lieved that some people, like “the savage people in many places of America”, 
were still living in the state of nature. (Hobbes, 1651: 63) This is not to say 
that such people have no rational faculties. Instead, Hobbes suggests that 
their ability to reason is not developed to the degree in which it is found 
in his English and European readers. For example, Hobbes argues that his 
 account of natural law is not damaged by the fact that the “Savage people 
of America” exist in the state of nature. By treating reason as universal (and, 
thus, non-identical to its realisation in particular human beings), Hobbes can 
effectively distinguish between reason and the imperfect ability to reason.
This effectively leaves room for the idea that reason progresses, both on 
micro and macro levels. On the micro level, the level of the individual, rea-
son is “attayned by Industry” since it is not “as Sense, and Memory, borne 
with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is”. (Hobbes, 1651: 
21) On a larger scale, this is reflected in “imposing of Names; and sec-
ondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from” them to 
 assertions and connections “till we come to a knowledge of all the Conse-
quences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men 
call SCIENCE.” (ibid.) As our hard work pays off and we continue to ac-
cumulate knowledge about ourselves and our societies, we may utilise it 
to improve our constitutions. The process that leads to the creation of the 
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state and helps the development of its constitution thus parallels scientific 
development. Both creation and improvement of a well-ordered society is 
a consequence of the industrious development of our reason and science. 
Hobbes compares this process to masonry:
“And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, ob-
served by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materi-
als, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind 
began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to 
constitute Commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, 
there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, 
to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting 
And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: Which wheth-
er they come not into the fight of those that have Power to make use of 
them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, 
at this day, very little.” (Hobbes, 1651: 176)
The optimal result of masonry and constitution-building is seen in the lon-
gevity of states and buildings. Long existence shows that both were built in 
accordance with the principles of reason, to which their creators came “by 
industrious meditation”. One’s ability to reason can, therefore, not only be 
“attayned by Industry” but also perfected through “industrious meditation”. 
This, however, has to be understood as a historical process since a Hobbes-
ian state cannot be created through a mutual contract that would mutually 
bind just a fragment of people. Instead, large numbers of people in the state 
of nature must first realise that they need a state and then expend effort 
in giving it the best constitution they can muster. This does not mean that 
their constitution will be the best possible. In fact, Hobbes’s argument is 
based on his view of dangerous shortcomings of contemporary and histor-
ical forms of government that can and often do lead to their “dissolution”. 
At the same time, Hobbes’s attempts at remedying these problems are indic-
ative of his belief that people living in 17th century Western Europe are (or 
at some point will be) generally able to reason sufficiently well to institute a 
Hobbesian commonwealth, while, for example, the native Americans lacked 
the rational ability to create a state in the first place.2 This is indicative of 
Hobbes’s account of progressive development of human rational capacities.
Men’s progress towards unveiling the principles of (universal) reason is pri-
marily reflected in the development of the state governed by an absolute 
2  It is more than likely that Hobbes had significant insight in the life of Native 
Americans, as he was involved in Virginia Company. This is why Malcolm (2003a: 75-
76) argues that “he must have been aware, if he had read accounts such as that of 
Purchas, that some Indian tribes did conform to his model of a commonwealth”. Accor-
ding to Malcolm (ibid.) Hobbes chose to exclude this from his account since “[t]his 
must have been embarrassing for his subsidiary theory that all the benefits of civiliza-
tion sprang directly from the leisure provided by secure government”.
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sovereign. As Hoekstra (2007: 115-116) notes, Hobbes “says in De Cive that 
the natural condition is the domain of passion, whereas civil society is the 
domain of reason; and in Leviathan he claims that he has shown in chapter 
xiii that ‘that miserable condition of war . . . is necessarily consequent . . . 
to the natural passions of men’ without sovereignty”. This, of course, does 
not mean that passions cease to influence people’s lives in the state of civil-
ity. They still do and this is one of the reasons why the sovereign should be 
obeyed unconditionally. Otherwise, as Hoekstra (2007: 116) shows, “even 
with natural reason, and even if many or most humans have moderate aims, 
war will ensue nonetheless.” This is why the laws are needed to limit liberty 
and, in Hobbes’s (1651: 107) mechanical terms, serve as “externall Imped-
iments of motion” that set external boundaries to human agency that is to 
large extent motivated by passions. If they are stable and strong, these “Im-
pediments” make subjects’ passions politically irrelevant in a well-function-
ing sovereign state. The political irrelevance of subjects’ passions thus goes 
hand in hand with the progressive development of their reasoning faculties. 
In a brief passage of De cive Hobbes (1978b: 91) paints quite an optimis-
tic picture of the progression of mankind, provided that the motivators of 
human behaviour are known and that the passions are kept under control:
“were the nature of humane actions as distinctly known as the nature 
of quantity in geometrical Figures, the strength of avarice and ambition, 
which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgar, as touching 
the nature of right and wrong, would presently faint and languish; and 
mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for 
habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her 
Inhabitants, there would hardly be left any pretence for war.”
The state has a distinguished role in directing the progression of humanity 
away from the sway of passions and towards perfecting their reasoning fac-
ulties. Moreover, the very existence of the sovereign’s absolute power and 
authority is an obstacle to his subjects’ relapsing into the state of nature that 
is dominated by passions. The reason that eventually conquers everybody’s 
fears of violent death is the reason of the sovereign, or as Hobbes (1651: 
20) calls it – the “right reason”. In comparison to the particular reasoning 
of his subjects, the sovereign’s reason is the “right Reason”, or “the Reason 
of [the] Arbitrator” which is decisive in any potential dispute between the 
subjects. (Hobbes, 1651: 20)3
Another important part of man’s rational development is belief in God. 
For Hobbes (1651: 51) realisation that God exists is a matter of reason, 
rather than strong faith, as “it is impossible to make any profound enquiry 
3  This, however, is not a consequence of the sovereign’s natural superiority. Hobbes 
(1651: 18) makes it clear that human reasoning capacities are roughly equal in their 
fallibility, as “no one mans Reason […] makes the certaintie”.
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into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is 
one God Eternall”. Faith in God is thus a consequence of correct reasoning 
while superstition is a product of ignorant fear as “they that make little, or 
no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that pro-
ceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do 
them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto them-
selves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible” (ibid.). Polytheism of “the Gen-
tiles” thus was a consequence of them basing their faith on a passion, in-
stead of deriving it from the principles of reason. Hobbes (1651: 53) argues 
that: “acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may 
more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of 
naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the 
feare of what was to be fall them in time to come.” Hobbes therefore cen-
tres his account of superstition on fear as the strongest of passions, which 
was previously discussed as the second constant of human existence. The 
progressive development of reasoning faculties happens in parallel to the 
transition from natural to civil condition as well as with the shift from fear-
ful superstition to rational religious belief. Progress is, therefore, an im-
portant feature of both faith and reason. The difference is only in the fact 
that the progress of reason is a necessary prerequisite for the progress of 
faith – in the same way it is necessary for the progress of science. Indeed, 
structurally speaking, for Hobbes the progress in faith parallels the prog-
ress in science: both developments encompass the development of reason 
and both rely on reason as a tool for verifying veracity of religious learn-
ing and scientific conclusions alike.
The unbearable lightness of being a sovereign
Sovereigns are only human. Although the sovereign wields augmented 
power of his subjects, he remains a fallible and frail human being. While 
the subjects’ psychological burden is alleviated by conjuring the common-
wealth, the sovereigns remain in the state of nature. Their condition re-
mains marked by potential conflict and mutual mistrust. Sovereigns face 
two chief dangers: internally, there is always a possibility of a revolt and 
civil war, and externally, there is a constant threat of foreign invasion. The 
sovereigns, “Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority”, exist in a (natu-
rally) hostile world, finding themselves in:
“continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having 
their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their 
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and 
continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But 
because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does 
not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of partic-
ular men.” (Hobbes, 1651: 63).
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As I have argued elsewhere, (Simendić, 2012) Hobbes’s sphere of interna-
tional relations is not dominated by the states’ raison d’État but by sover-
eigns’ own reason, passions, interests and fears. As any other human being, 
no sovereign is motivated only by reason: they are jealous, distrustful and 
afraid of others who share their predicament and threaten them by their 
“Forts, Garrisons, and Guns”. When compared to a person in the state of 
nature, a sovereign is generally motivated by the exact same set of passions, 
has the same level of control over his passions and has no superior ratio-
nal faculty. Therefore, the sovereign’s behaviour is determined by the very 
same set of natural motivating factors. The difference is only in the context. 
Individuals in the state of nature are surrounded by other natural persons, 
while a sovereign is surrounded by other sovereigns and their states. And 
although a sovereign is much more powerful than his subjects, his power 
is commeasurable with the strength of other sovereigns. Finally, Hobbes 
(1651: 63) argues that “because [the sovereigns] uphold thereby, the In-
dustry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which 
accompanies the Liberty of particular men.” Indeed, Hobbes’s argument is 
that the subjects are much better off living under a sovereign than in the 
state of nature. However, the sovereigns are a result of the social contract 
and not a part of it, so even with the might of their entire commonwealths 
at their disposal, they remain in the state of nature. The emergence of the 
state absolves the subjects from fear and uncertainty, which are the two 
consequences of Hobbes’s anthropology in the state of nature. However, by 
remaining in the state of nature, the sovereign does not experience such 
catharsis and he is not relieved of his natural existential burden. The sover-
eign is not relieved of the psychological pressures that drove his very sub-
jects to renounce their natural rights. He is confronted with other agents 
in the natural condition (most notably other sovereigns) and, although he 
has no obligations towards his subjects, he can never be absolutely certain 
of their loyalty, either. Furthermore, although the sovereign and his subjects 
share the urge for self-preservation, there is one noteworthy difference be-
tween them. Because the sovereign continues to live in the state of nature 
his passions continue to be politically salient. The civil condition, on the 
other hand, is the state where (sovereign-mediated) reason is supposed to 
dominate and where the passions of the subjects are held in check by sov-
ereign coercion. Their liberty being unrestrained by external coercion, and 
unlike their subjects who live in “the domain of reason”, the sovereigns are 
still a part of “the domain of passion”. (Hoekstra 2007: 116)
Even though Hobbes does not explicitly suggest any, there are at least two 
potential consequences of the sovereign being “left behind” in the  natural 
state of radical insecurity and discontent. Firstly, the situation can be re-
solved through a long series of conflicts that would lead to the rule of a 
single sovereign. Secondly, as they are not contractually bound to be or to 
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remain sovereigns, the sovereigns can choose to enter a social contract of 
their own and pass on the hot potato of sovereignty to a single sovereign. 
In fact, Hobbes (1651: 102) acknowledges consensual transfer of power 
when he suggests that a sovereign’s “Power cannot, without his consent, be 
Transferred to another”. (my italics) Furthermore, in both of these cases the 
transfer of authority between the sovereigns would not face any resistance 
from their (now former) subjects because Hobbes (1651: 101-107) clear-
ly states that being a part of a “Common-wealth by Acquisition” grants no 
special rights to rebellion to the subjects, as “the Rights, and Consequenc-
es of Soveraignty, are the same in both”.
If we now turn back to Hobbes’s mechanicist and progressivist view of na-
ture and psychology, we will see that the evolution of authority starts in 
the prepolitical state of nature in which sovereignty is particularised within 
every individual human being and that it gradually encompasses more and 
more people (first within families, then cities and states). This historical 
process is marked by constant extension and defragmentation of power and 
sovereignty. Indeed, Hobbes (1651: 85) describes this when he discusses 
the historical enlargement of “dominions” as a transition from smaller to 
larger sovereign entities: “And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cit-
ies and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) 
enlarge their Dominions”. The process starts with initial defragmentation 
of individuals’ natural “right to every thing” (Hobbes, 1651: 65) that gets 
gradually added up to a total of sovereign power (summa potestas). This 
progressive adding of power might come to its natural end in a very inter-
esting way and merge with Hobbes’s views on Christian eschatology. The 
sovereign who ends up governing the world would thus be the Biblical an-
tichrist, as he would govern the entire Earth instead of Christ.
It is important to underline that such a sovereign is somebody who is the 
essence of a commonwealth that is a “Mortall God”. The distinction between 
mortal Leviathan and the immortal God is not in the ungodly nature of 
the former, but in its “mortality”. (Hobbes, 1651: 88) This mortality comes 
from internal and external causes of the “Dissolution of a Common-wealth”. 
Therefore, if Hobbes’s comparison and equation of the state with God is 
more than a simple metaphor,4 the single unified Leviathan is the equiva-
lent of the single God while its sovereign representative, is a pretender on 
the throne of Christ who is God’s representative on Earth. Such a person 
is, by definition, the Antichrist as he “usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, 
which Christ took not on him [and] he doth it as Christ” and, not unlike 
4  And there are good reasons in favour of believing that such an important claim 
has to be more than a metaphor, not at least because Hobbes (1651: 14) considered 
metaphors as something that “deceive[s] others” and that “in reckoning, and seeking 
of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted”. (Hobbes, 1651: 21)
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Pope, “give[s] Laws to all Christian Kings, and Nations”. (Hobbes, 1651: 
305) This potential sovereign of the world would find himself in a situa-
tion that is radically different from any other human being’s. His powers 
would be unprecedented and his will would be the will of the Leviathan 
who truly has nobody and nothing to fear on Earth. Moreover, the unifica-
tion of all earthly authority would eliminate all the external threats to the 
world government. The internal causes of its “dissolution” would also be 
eliminated with the progression of reason as “may, Principles of Reason be 
found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting 
by externall violence) everlasting” (Hobbes, 1651: 176). Without the threat 
of “externall violence” and by establishing the “everlasting” constitution, 
the “Mortall God” rises up to the immortal one, and its sovereign repre-
sentative becomes the equivalent of Christ, God’s representative on Earth.
The uncertain path to the Kingdom of God
The arrival of the Antichrist would be the event that immediately precedes 
the Second Coming of Christ and consequent institution of the Kingdom of 
God on Earth: “Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God 
is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact, but 
our Civill Soveraigns”. (Hobbes, 1651: 335) It is very important to note, 
however, that Hobbes never actually mentions the Antichrist in this context. 
This is not to say that he does not mention the Anti christ at all. In Leviathan 
he discusses at length whether the Pope can be considered an antichrist. 
Hobbes (1651: 303) discusses both meanings of the word: “one that false-
ly pretendeth to be His Lieutenant, or Vicar generall, but to be Hee” and 
“this speciall Antichrist, [...] (Mat. 24. 15.) [...] that abominable Destroy-
er, spoken of by Daniel”. In both cases, contrary to the common Protestant 
view, Hobbes’s answer is negative. It is clear that Hobbes has given signif-
icant thought to this issue and this makes the fact that he failed to offer a 
more elaborate account of Christian eschatology even more striking. What 
is clearly missing is the discussion about the progression of “human condi-
tion” from his day until the Second coming. There are at least two possible 
reasons behind this omission.
The first reason is both political and methodological. In De cive Hobbes ar-
gues that “we may not, as in a Circle, begin the handling of a Science from 
what point we please. There is a certain Clue of Reason, whose beginning 
is in the dark, but by the benefit of whose Conduct, wee are led as ‘twere by 
the hand into the clearest light”. (Hobbes, 1978b: 92) He then goes on to 
describe how he had addressed the issue of natural justice by analysing ev-
ery concept that belongs to an array of causes and consequences that begins 
with human nature and ends with natural justice. Eschatology, on the oth-
er hand, is descriptive of absolutely certain events that take place in future 
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and this is not a matter of scientific enquiry as “[n]o man can know by Dis-
course, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely” 
(Hobbes, 1651: 30; the emphasis is mine). This is why Hobbes can rightfully 
consider Biblical writings descriptive of the past as truly historical (and thus 
related to the process of scientific discovery) while discussing eschatological 
predictions on their own terms, as unrelated to any particular happening of 
his time. John Pocock (1989: 198) is right to emphasise Hobbes’s distinction 
between “timeless” eschatology and temporal history and his attack on those 
who confuse the two and make a case for “spiritual jurisdiction”. Therefore, 
as we have seen, Hobbes denies that the Pope is the antichrist.
The lack of connection between Hobbes’s discussion of current affairs and 
his eschatology was uncommon for his time. Not only that the coming of 
the year 1666 gave rise to a number of millenarian accounts, but also it 
was quite common in the 17th century England for one to label his oppo-
nents as “antichrists”. The latter is especially true for the middle of the 
17th century, when it was a common practice for the Parliamentarian pam-
phleteers to label the King and their ecclesial opponents as antichristian, 
if not antichrist(s).5 The danger of such arguments went beyond simple 
name-calling and terminological “confusion” as they presupposed the su-
periority of divine over civil right. Hobbes responded by arguing that there 
is nothing anti-Christian in absolute civil authority and he “had written at 
length about apocalyptic because this was a necessary means of destroy-
ing the spiritual usurpations that England seemed to be overcoming at the 
end of the Civil Wars”. (ibid.) Hobbes’s account differed from such “con-
fused” discussions in one additional aspect. Contrary to the widespread 
belief in his day, Hobbes did not believe that the Armageddon is at hand. 
Not only that he does not mention the Second coming of Christ as an im-
minent event, but he also explicitly states that “that tribulation is not yet 
come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the 
Sun and Moon, a falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the 
glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds. And therefore The An-
tichrist is not yet come.” (Hobbes, 1651: 303). The fact that, to use Poco-
ck’s terms, Hobbes distinguished between (historical) “time” and (divine) 
“timeless” does not mean that the two are mutually inoperable. To an ex-
tent they have to be commensurable, not at least because Hobbes believed 
the Earth to be stage for both history and eschatology. Hobbes does not 
argue that the two are incommensurable; he just argues that the time for 
the timeless has not yet come.
5  I am indebted to Christopher Hill for this analysis. Hill (1971: 79) notes that the 
“[u]se of the phrase ‘Antichrist’s party’ to describe the King’s armed supporters at once 
opened up propagandist possibilities similar to those which Elizabeth’s government 
had seen in the equation of Pope and Antichrist”. King himself was referred to as the 
Beast in a number of pamphlets published after 1643. (Hill, 1971: 86-87)
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This leads us the second reason why Hobbes might have chosen not to 
take his deterministic account of the state and human nature to its logical 
conclusion. It seems that Hobbes was very much aware of the (theological 
problem of) dual nature of political power and authority. On one hand, 
the sovereign power is a God-given consequence of human nature while, 
on the other, its continual defragmentation necessarily leads to the (anti-
christian) rule by a single sovereign. For Hobbes, emphasising the latter 
over the former would entail supporting the horrors of anarchy and writing 
in favour of slowing down the progression of mankind. That alone would 
be sufficient for any vocal opponent of division of power not to take this 
route and to choose to leave this aspect out. That being said, the state re-
mains a peculiar beast, not unlike the Biblical leviathan. And leviathan, 
as Malcolm (2007: 23) suggests, was a common allegory for the Devil, 
“Antichrist, or […] other diabolical forces on earth.” Not unlike the state 
in my interpretation of Hobbes’s eschatology, “leviathan” is characterised 
as “a mighty creation of God, in the powers of which God seemed to take 
some pride; however, some of the other passages (notably Isaiah 27:1) 
suggested a monstrous being with which God must eventually engage in 
apocalyptic combat” (Malcolm, 2007: 25). Indeed, Hobbes (1651: 168) 
says that: “there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that [leviathan] 
should stand in fear of” (my italics). It might be that, comparably to “anti-
christ”, Hobbes speaks of a leviathan and the leviathan where a leviathan is 
a commonwealth and the leviathan is the entity that has nothing (no other 
leviathans) to fear on earth. Therefore, there are at least some reasons to 
believe that Hobbes’s omission of detailed descriptions of progression of 
mankind towards unified authority that ends in the Apocalypse was delib-
erate. Hobbes, as someone who vigorously supported absolute authority, 
never fully explained the reasons behind labelling the state as a demonic 
beast nor described how the transition into the Kingdom of God might take 
place. On the other hand, Hobbes is explicit about Christ’s rule happening 
on Earth and it being exclusive of human sovereignty, as “the Kingdom of 
God is a Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign” and “the 
Kingdom of God is to be on Earth” (Hobbes, 1651: 241; 219-220).
These developments seem to be fuelled by the progress in reasoning facul-
ties that, in turn, leads to better ability to grasp the universal and  God-given 
natural laws. As I have discussed earlier, at one of the steps of this progres-
sion, a rational human being becomes aware of the fact that creation of 
the world can only be explained through a single cause and that leads him 
to monotheism. As this realisation alone is not sufficient for him becom-
ing a part of the Kingdom of God, he has to accept the fundamental article 
of faith, the one that stipulates that “Jesus is the Christ”. Teaching and in-
forming people of this article is exactly what the church is supposed to do: 
“The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of 
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Christ, and a preparation for his second comming; as the Evangelization of 
John Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.” (Hobbes, 1651: 270) 
The final result of this process is the division of mankind into Christians 
and those who do not believe that “Jesus is the Christ”. From the fragmen-
tation of power that comes as a consequence of Hobbes’s interpretation of 
Christian eschatology, temporarily arises the new bipolar order after the 
Judgement that lasts until the Second (Everlasting) Death of the last of the 
infidels. (Hobbes, 1651: 246) The dividing lines are drawn on Earth, be-
tween the Christian subjects of the Kingdom of God and those who are not 
a part of this realm and are, therefore, the enemies of God, “[f]or without 
the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment, are compre-
hended in the Kingdome of Satan.” (Hobbes, 1651: 277) After the Resur-
rection Christians would become the subjects of God’s Kingdom whose rule 
would be mediated through Christ, as it was the case with Moses and the 
Israelites: “he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is King 
already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; 
but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with 
him in their Baptisme.” (Hobbes, 1651: 264) They would  enjoy “[t]he 
joyes of Life Eternall”. (Hobbes, 1651: 245) On the other hand, “the Rep-
robates” would live in the Kingdom of Satan, “The Enemy, [whose] King-
dome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews 
had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations 
round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and consequently by Sa-
tan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.” (Hobbes, 1651: 244) It 
is noteworthy that Hobbes’s definition of Satan as “any Earthly Enemy of 
the Church” corresponds with “another usuall signification of the word 
Antichrist” as “an Adversary of Iesus the true Christ”. (Hobbes, 1651: 304) 
Therefore, in a general sense, the Kingdom of Satan is identified with the 
kingdom of Antichrist.
Conclusion
Regardless of earthly authority being unified before or through the Second 
Coming of Christ, the antecedent process remains the same. The natural 
progression that starts from a number of atomised individuals in the state 
of nature ends with their unity within the state as a single entity. This is 
accompanied by the transformation from the rule of passions and particu-
larised reason to the rule of universal Reason and followed by the develop-
ments in religious belief. Internal motives drive every person in the state of 
nature to relinquish his fragmented piece of sovereignty (his “right to every 
thing”) in favour of a single person who becomes their sovereign. For nat-
ural persons in the prepolitical state of nature, the only possible (and ra-
tionally preferred) outcome is their cathartic conferral of power to a single 
sovereign that leads to the creation of the state. As I have demonstrated, the 
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sovereigns remain in natural condition, have no direct duty towards their 
subjects6 and their position is no different than the position of other natural 
persons. This entails that they share the same psychological burden as their 
prepolitical counterparts and that they are as strongly inclined to pass the 
hot potato of sovereignty to others until the single sovereign emerges who 
has no other sovereigns to fear and whose only concern is to rule in accor-
dance with the natural reason. These transformations occur in parallel with 
gradual advancement of human reasoning capacities and abilities to grasp 
God-given universal reason, accept its laws and understand the fundamen-
tal article of faith. And this is the point where Hobbes’s dynamic anthro-
pological framework might transgress the sphere of international relations 
and step into the final stages of Christian eschatology. If Hobbes indeed 
believed that the defragmentation of power leads to establishing a single 
world sovereign who could be considered as the antichrist, his  account of 
eschatological theocracy that would exist on Earth would not appear at all 
disjointed from the rest of his political philosophy. This would also give a 
fuller meaning to his underlying claim about the progression of reason and 
human knowledge by which “Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the 
way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end”. (Hobbes, 1651: 22)
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Priroda, građansko stanje i eshatologija:  
Hobsova ideja napretka u tri čina
Apstrakt
Argument ovog rada je da teorija Tomasa Hobsa sadrži ideju progresivnog ukrup-
njavanja i ujedinjenja moći koju prati napredovanje ljudskog razuma. Ukoliko je 
napuštanje prirodnog stanja i potčinjavanje suverenu posledica ljudske prirode, 
slično bi trebalo da važi i za same suverene, pošto Hobs smatra da oni i dalje 
žive u prirodnom stanju. Prema tome, odnosi među suverenima trebalo bi tako-
đe da vode do ukrupnjavanja političke vlasti, kako osvajanjem, tako i miroljubivom 
predajom vlasti. Eventualna potpuna defragmentacija moći može takođe imati i 
eshatološke posledice, pošto bi objedinjena moć jednog čoveka nad celim svetom 
uklonila nasilje koje je pretilo od drugih suverena kao razlog raspadanja države, 
dok bi napredak razuma postepeno uklonio njene unutrašnje nesavršenosti. Ova 
bi hipotetička situacija mogla povezati Hobsov opis carstva Božjeg iz Levijatana 
sa njegovom širom političkom teorijom: jedinstveni suvereni predstavnik (sada) 
besmrtnog i sveobuhvatnog levijatana bi se mogao smatrati Antihristom, što bi 
najavilo drugi Hristov dolazak.
Ključne reči: Hobs, napredak, determinizam, suveren, svetska vlada, antihrist
